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Commentary
by
Bernard S. Meyer*
One cannot read "Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and
Technology" without a great deal of interest and admiration, for its
basic concept-that since strict liability views the cost of injury as a
cost of the product, it is the product itself rather than the manufacturer's conduct that should be tried-is seminal. As with most such
proposals, however, it is bound to travel a rocky road before it finally,
because of its sheer common sense, becomes an accepted part of our
practice.
Part of the resistance will come from the trial bar, especially the
plaintiff's bar, which is bound to react even more strongly to this proposal than it did to bifurcation of the liability and injury issues, since
this proposal not only excludes injury evidence but includes evidence
concerning the economics of the product. Part of the resistance will
also result from the greatly increased burdens that will be imposed on
the courts, which will not only be trying the action in several steps,
but also will be holding pre-trial conferences of a widely different
nature than presently do most state courts.
To one who thinks the matter through, the need for an election of
remedies at the pre-trial stage, for pre-trial qualification of experts, and
for trial as a separate issue of the question whether the product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous is apparent, yet all three seem
strongly defense oriented. It will be important, therefore, if the proposal is ultimately to be accepted, that the plaintiff's interests be balanced by discovery rules assuring plaintiff broad access to defense evidence, expert reports and the like.
Thus, though the jury can reach a more logical result concerning the
existence of a defect without the appeal to sympathy involved in evidence concerning plaintiff's injury and without the prejudice that
testimony concerning the manufacturer's conduct may generate, exclusion of such evidence is fair only if plaintiff is given pre-trial access to
all the data that defendant will offer concerning product economics in
order to be able to meet defendant's risk-utility evidence when pre* Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 1959-1972; Member of the
New York Bar.
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sented. Likewise, requiring plaintiff to elect prior to trial which theory
of liability the case will be tried on can be justified as reducing jury
confusion, but is fair to plaintiff only if, at the time he is called, upon
to make his election, he has as much knowledge of defendant's evidence countering each of plaintiff's theories of liability as he would
have under existing rules under which election would be made, if
required, at the end of the whole case.
Especially intriguing to a former trial judge is the suggestion that
the project expects ultimately to develop standards concerning the
appropriateness of expertise. Since that is a matter within the trial
judge's discretion, and since the trial judge's rulings are normally
made from the bench during the course of the trial, there is little law
available on the subject. One has the impression, however, that few
experts are ever found not qualified, and that qualification of an expert
on sometimes sketchy background data is probably a function of the
time the issue is presented, and the disruption into which the trial will
be thrown (if, indeed, it does not end in dismissal) if he is found not
qualified.
Pre-trial qualification, when coupled with standards on expertise,
should reduce the risk of minimally qualified experts that now exists,
but in a matter as complex as some products liability cases will it be
possible for the judge to pass upon the expert's qualifications in a pretrial hearing without getting fairly deeply involved in what the trial
evidence will be? In other words, may we not be creating just another
minitrial? The answer probably lies in the expertise standards which
may, therefore, play an important part in the acceptance or rejection
of the pre-trial qualification concept.
Not entirely clear is the study's reference to the myth of absolute
scientific certainty in the expert's having reached his conclusion. An
engineering expert, for example, presents his conclusions on the
basis of "reasonable engineering certainty" and the jury is told that
it is at liberty to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the expert
opinion given, as they find they should on the basis of a review of all
of the evidence, expert and other, and of the expert's qualifications in
his field. Clearly then, present practice presents the expert's view as
what it is-an educated but not incontrovertible judgment.
Indeed, in proposing that the jury be required to evaluate opposing
opinions and choose between them, rather than be permitted to conjure up its own scientific theory within the range of the opposing
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opinions, the study is giving greater absoluteness to opinion evidence
than presently it is given. Yet in matters as complex as most product
liability cases turn out to be, it seems clear that any other rule than
that suggested can lead to jury verdicts without a true scientific basis,
for which the only possible corrective will be a cumbersome and ineffective motion to set the verdict aside as against the weight of the evidence.
Finally, serious question exists whether the courts should become
involved in the preservation of evidence as the study suggests. Aside
from questions concerning liability for evidence lost or damaged while
in the custody of the court, the expense involved in the establishment
of conveniently located agencies to receive and maintain such evidence
should be imposed not on the taxpayers but on the litigants. It seems
much more sensible to rely on the self-interest of the adversaries, for
one side need only show that there is reasonable question concerning
how the evidence is being maintained by the other to get an order
directing where and by whom evidence shall be held until trial. Generally, such evidence will be retained by the testing laboratory from
which comes the expert who will testify. Probably there should be, in
addition, an expansion of the rule permitting an adverse inference to be
drawn against a party who fails to produce documents within his control. Under the expanded rule a similar inference should be permissible
if the jury finds that either through gross negligence or intentional conduct product liability evidence has been permitted so to deteriorate as
not to furnish a basis upon trial for the statement of an expert opinion.
The points that have been made are but minor modifications in an
unusual and unusually well thought out proposal. Adoption of its
concepts will constitute a giant forward step in the trial of product
liability cases.
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